Post Categories: Africa
Shamus Cooke | Saturday, June 2, 2012, 9:39 Beijing
Shamus Cooke | Saturday, June 2, 2012, 9:39 Beijing
In a country where the embers of revolution are still glowing, you
would assume that a presidential election would produce a
revolutionary-appearing government. Not so in Egypt. The revolutionaries
who toppled the hated dictator Mubarak will have zero representation in
the upcoming runoff election for president.
Those who opposed the revolution, however, are well represented. The
runoff election features Ahmed Shafiq, the dictator’s former Prime
Minister who remains a military strongmen. Shafiq’s presence in the
election is a stark reminder that the revolution’s goals have yet to be
accomplished.
The other non-revolutionary presidential contender is Mohamed Morsi
of the Muslim Brotherhood. The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood
stayed quiet during the initial phase of the revolution until their
youth wing dragged them into the fray. The leadership has since
pretended to be an ally of the revolution, but their fake revolutionary
credentials have been exposed several times since winning a large chunk
of parliamentary seats, steadily eroding their popularity.
For example, Egypt’s executive power still consists of a cabinet
handpicked by the military, a fact that began to fan the revolution’s
hot coals, re-igniting mass protests. The Muslim Brotherhood stayed
silent — as before — until the heat once again forced them into action:
the Brotherhood shut down parliament, demanding that the army’s cabinet
step down.
But the military responded with inaction and threatened to shutdown
parliament permanently. The Brotherhood responded by compelling the
re-opening of parliament, and the cabinet remained in place.
The Brotherhood is now correctly viewed by many as being somewhat
subservient to the military, a role their leadership played
pre-revolution. This exposure accounts for the drop in their popularity
that resulted in their earning only 25 percent of first round
Presidential votes, after winning 47 percent of the Parliamentary seats
in November/December.
Regardless of which candidate wins the election, the military could
very well remain the real power in the country. This is because Egypt
still lacks a constitution; the new president will literally have zero
power until one is created. If the military’s candidate loses they will
fight to limit the president’s power. Many of the more honest
contenders for president have already boycotted the election for this
reason.
A Constituent Assembly had been bureaucratically set up by Egypt’s
Muslim Brotherhood-dominated parliament to write a constitution, but
other parties boycotted it because of the Brotherhood’s overwhelming
power over the proceedings. Then Egypt’s military-dominated courts dissolved the Assembly ,
probably to keep the Brotherhood’s power in check (the military and the
Brotherhood have a love-hate relationship, relying on each other as
props while simultaneously vying for power).
The pathetic state of Egypt’s democracy led the spokesman for the
military’s candidate, Ahmed Shafiq, to declare “the revolution has
ended.” But he has spoken too soon. When stripped down to its
essentials, a revolution is the majority of working people actively
engaged in politics. And because the coming election will not allow this
majority an avenue to be engaged in politics, they will likely continue
their political engagement in the streets.
Inevitably, however, the revolutionaries will learn that it’s not
enough to oust Mubarak; a positive vision must replace the dictator,
lest representatives of the old regime attempt to replace the dictator
with his clone.
Hopefully, the revolutionaries will create a vision that unites them
against their opponents, while organizing themselves as a cohesive,
powerful social force that can withstand the organized power of the
past, complete with inspiring ideas capable of mobilizing working people
and truly transforming society, as opposed to a mere shuffling at the
top.
The Egyptian ruling class is consciously using these elections to
channel the revolution’s energy into a dead-end. This is a timeless
revolution-killing strategy: the ruling class calls for an election
before the revolutionaries have had the time to properly organize
themselves, leaving the election to be won by those groups — The Muslim
Brotherhood and the army in this case — who were organized
pre-revolution. The winners of revolutions are the organized or the
wealthy, often times both.
Egyptian society will refuse to remain calm after these elections;
there are too many economic and social problems that remain unfixed
post-revolution, most notably high unemployment within an economy in
shambles.
The military government has already asked the U.S.-dominated
International Monetary Fund for a $3.2 billion loan , which will not be
finalized until after the elections. The delay was intentional, since
the conditions of the debt deal will inevitably include austerity — cuts
to basic social programs, elimination of gas and food
subsidies, combined with privatizations of the public sector and other
anti-worker policies.
Like the revolutionaries in Greece, Egyptians will fight against
austerity while fighting for a truly democratic Constituent Assembly;
either issue by itself could re-spark the still smoldering revolution.
But democracy will have a new meaning for Egypt’s revolutionaries:
the abstract ideal will be tossed aside in favor of a democracy of
economic and social equality, requiring that the economic and social
power of Egypt’s old rulers be smashed.
No comments:
Post a Comment